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ABSTRACT 
 
Copyright issues are litigated in the United States every 
day. Yet attorneys representing visual artists settle suits 
more often when those suits involve the potential of a 
copyright infringement, partly because of the relatively few 
decisions on the matter. In Harney v. Sony Pictures, Inc., 
the First Circuit found that a copyrighted photograph could 
be copied to look nearly the same as the original because 
the copied elements were each unprotectable under the 
copyright. The copyright protected only those elements of 
the photo that were the result of the photographer’s choices 
in depicting the subject. The court held that the placement 
of the subjects in the frame of the photo was the only 
protected feature shared by the recreation, and this was 
insufficient to establish “substantial similarity” necessary 
for the court to find a copyright violation. This Article puts 
forth an organizational scheme based on existing cases to 
help attorneys defend their clients’ work. By explaining 
how attorneys have avoided substantial similarity findings 
in the past and how courts treat different approaches, this 
Article will provide attorneys with guidance on avoiding a 
substantial similarity finding in their clients’ works, 
focusing specifically on photographs. 
                                                                                                             
* Rachael Wallace, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 
2015. Thank you to Prof. Elizabeth Porter for her guidance and support; to 
Steven Crozier for his insight and feedback; and to the many editors at the 
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts for their diligence and aid. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As photography becomes an increasingly popular medium, 
photographers and visual artists who wish to recreate some aspects 
of a photo are susceptible to copyright suits against them. 
Attorneys representing artists face mounting confusion over 
copyright infringement in their clients’ work. For an attorney 
representing an artist who has referenced or recreated another’s 
copyrighted art, the law is unclear as to which elements of the 
reproduction are copyrightable and which elements are 
unprotectable. Courts have never explicitly listed the features of a 
photo that are copyrightable and instead apply a series of tests to 
determine if infringement occurred. While the refusal to create any 
per se rules can be frustrating to a visual artist toeing the line and 
to that artist’s attorney, courts are wise to avoid a per se rule that 
2
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might stifle creativity. Partly because copyrightable features are 
not clearly explained, many parties in these kinds of copyright 
disputes end up settling out of court, thereby perpetuating the 
confusion. 
While it would be impossible to create a list of “off-limits” 
features that cannot be recreated in a photo, circuit courts tend to 
protect the creative decisions a photographer or artist would 
consciously make in order to create an original work. An attorney 
should identify any intentional creative decisions that the original 
artist made and distinguish those creative decisions from the 
client’s work. Copyright infringement by recreated photographs 
can be particularly difficult to prove because the subject matter 
itself is not copyrightable. An attorney can avoid a “substantial 
similarity” finding—and thereby avoid a copyright infringement 
finding—by showing that the client did not copy creative decisions 
of the original artist and instead copied only subject matter. 
Defining which elements are not substantially similar can guide 
attorneys and help avoid settling meritless suits out of fear or 
confusion. 
 
I. EXPANSION OF COPYRIGHT TO PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
The U.S. Constitution governs copyright law. Article I, Section 
8, Clause 8 of the Constitution provides that Congress shall have 
the exclusive power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”1 For many years, copyright law applied only to 
literal writings and discoveries, but over time Congress expanded 
the definition of “writings” to include “maps, charts, dramatic or 
musical compositions, engravings, cuts, prints, paintings, 
drawings, statues, statuary, and models or designs intended to be 
perfected as works of the fine arts.”2 But the United States 
Supreme Court faced a dilemma in Burrow–Giles Lithographic 
Co. v. Sarony.3 There, Napoleon Sarony, a famed photographer, 
                                                                                                             
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
2 Burrow–Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56 (1884). 
3 Id. at 52. 
3
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sued Burrow–Giles Lithographic Company for marketing 
unauthorized lithographs of a famous photograph Sarony had taken 
of Oscar Wilde.4  
 
 
Figure 1: Left, Napoleon Sarony’s lithograph. Right, Burrow–Giles 
Lithographic Company’s advertisement. 
 
Congress had not specifically included photographs as 
protected by copyright law, yet photographs concern the same type 
of artistic expression as other items included under “writings.”5 
The Court struggled with the scope of Clause 8, but concluded 
that, because Congress protected “literary productions . . . by 
which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible 
expression,” photographs should also be protected by copyright 
law.6 The Court explained: 
                                                                                                             
4 Id. at 54–55. 
5 Id. at 56. 
6 Id. at 58. 
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The only reason why photographs were not 
included in the extended list in the act of 1802 is, 
probably, that they did not exist, as photography, as 
an art, was then unknown, and the scientific 
principle on which it rests, and the chemicals and 
machinery by which it is operated, have all been 
discovered long since that statute was enacted.7 
Because photographs combine a snapshot of reality and an artist’s 
expression of that reality, copyright suits involving photographs 
are particularly difficult and amount to an extensive sorting 
assignment between elements of the photograph that the copyright 
protects and elements that a court would find unprotected. 
 
II. HARNEY V. SONY PICTURE TELEVISION, INC. 
 
In January 2013, the First Circuit handed down a curious 
decision in Harney v. Sony Picture Television, Inc.8 The court held 
that, despite the remarkable similarities between two photographs, 
the publication of the second, nearly identical photograph did not 
infringe on the copyright of the first.9 The First Circuit’s ruling 
changed no substantive law. Instead, the court determined whether 
the protectable elements were “substantially similar” in the second 
photograph.10 
The case concerned an original photograph taken by Donald 
Harney, a freelance photographer. Harney took the photograph 
during an idyllic Palm Sunday service in the Beacon Hill section of 
Boston.11 The photograph features a young girl riding on her 
father’s shoulders. A church stands in the distance.12 The 
photograph became widely disseminated in the media after it was 
discovered that the father depicted in the photograph was actually a 
German serial imposter who had abducted his daughter during a 
                                                                                                             
7 Id. 
8 704 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 2013). 
9 Id. at 186. 
10 Id. at 182. 
11 Id. at 176. 
12 Id. 
5
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custodial visit.13 Sony Pictures later recreated the photo for its 
dramatic film on the underlying story.14 Harney then sued Sony 
Pictures for copyright infringement.15 
 
 
Figure 2: Left, Donald Harney’s photograph. Right, Sony’s promotional 
recreation. 
 
The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Sony Pictures, holding that “it is permissible 
to mimic the non-copyrightable elements of a copyrighted work.”16 
Though the two photographs looked nearly identical, the court 
explained: “[c]opyright protection ‘extend[s] only to those 
components of a work that are original to the author,’ and a work 
that is sufficiently ‘original’ to be copyrighted may nonetheless 
contain unoriginal elements.”17 Because Sony Pictures copied only 
                                                                                                             
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 177. 
15 Id. at 176. 
16 Id. at 178. 
17 Id. (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 
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unprotected elements, including the subject matter and pose, the 
photographs shared “factual content . . . but not Harney's 
expressive elements.”18 
Harney provides guidance to attorneys defending a copyright 
suit involving visual art and photographs. If an attorney can 
successfully argue that the client only copied unprotected elements 
from the original work—no matter how many of those unprotected 
elements were copied—the attorney may defeat a copyright 
violation claim. 
 
III. ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
 
In 1991, the Supreme Court held that a person alleging a 
copyright infringement must show: “(1) ownership of a valid 
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that 
are original.”19 The second element typically is contested among 
parties in a copyright suit, and can be further broken down into two 
prongs: (1) actual copying and (2) copying of original elements. 
 
A.  Actual Copying 
 
A plaintiff can prove actual copying through direct evidence.20 
In Rogers v. Koons, the visual artist Jeff Koons provided his 
employees with a photograph of a couple holding puppies, taken 
by the plaintiff Art Rogers.21 Koons directed the employees to 
copy “the very details of the photograph that embodied plaintiff's 
original contribution—the poses, the shading, the expressions . . . 
.”22 
 
                                                                                                             
348 (1991)). 
18 Id. (quoting Harney v. Sony Pictures Television, Inc., CIV.A. 10-11181-
RWZ, 2011 WL 1811656, at *2 (D. Mass. May 12, 2011), aff’d, 704 F.3d 173 
(1st Cir. 2013)). 
19 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
20 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1992). 
21 Id. at 305. 
22 Id. at 307. 
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Figure 3: Left, Art Rogers’ photograph. Right, Jeff Koons’ sculpture. 
 
In granting summary judgment to the plaintiff, the Second 
Circuit explained that the “undisputed direct evidence of copying 
is sufficient to support the district court’s granting of summary 
judgment.”23 Moreover, “proof of actual access or strong 
likelihood of access to copyrighted works increases exposure to 
liability for copyright infringement.”24 Thus, while a plaintiff can 
show infringement by proving actual copying, the vast majority of 
cases lack sufficient evidence to prove actual copying, and to 
succeed a plaintiff must make an adequate showing that the 
challenged work is “substantially similar.” 
 
B.  Substantial Similarity 
 
When a visual work of art has not been literally copied and no 
direct evidence of copying exists, courts must determine whether, 
despite some differences in works of art, one work has infringed on 
the copyright of another. Not all copying constitutes copyright 
infringement.25 The copyright only protects original elements.26 
Courts look to whether the two works of art are “substantially 
similar,” focusing only on the elements of the first item that are 
protected by a valid copyright. However, courts have struggled to 
define “substantial similarity” when evidence of actual copying is 
                                                                                                             
23 Id. 
24 ANN BARTOW, COPYRIGHTS AND CREATIVE COPYING 83 (2004). 
25 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
26 ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY 
IN COPYRIGHT LAW 1–1 (Practising Law Institute, 2011). 
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missing. While substantial similarity is not one of the elements of 
copyright infringement, courts factor whether two works are 
substantially similar to “adjudicate whether copying of the 
‘constituent elements of the work that are original’ actually 
occurred when an allegedly infringing work appropriates elements 
of an original without reproducing it in toto.”27 
Attorneys who represent a client charged with copyright 
infringement need to dissect each element of the work of art and 
decide at what point (if any) infringement has occurred. “The 
problem, then, is one of line drawing. Somewhere between the one 
extreme of no similarity and the other of complete and literal 
similarity lies the line marking off the boundaries of ‘substantial 
similarity.’”28 Circuit courts complicate the matter by applying 
different “substantial similarity” tests in different ways.  
 
IV. AVOIDING LIABILITY FOR INFRINGEMENT 
 
For a copyright violation to be present, the plaintiff must prove 
that the traits of the defendant’s work “that he or she alleges are 
infringing are: (1) similar to (2) elements in the plaintiff’s work 
that reflect or constitute the plaintiff’s original expression, (3) 
which, when viewed in the context of the plaintiff’s work as a 
whole, are substantial, both qualitatively and quantitatively.”29 
Several paths are available for an attorney to shield clients 
from copyright infringement liability. As an initial matter, an 
attorney should know which test the circuit court will use to 
determine substantial similarity.  
 
 
                                                                                                             
27 Range Rd. Music, Inc. v. E. Coast Foods, Inc., 668 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
28 4–13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT: 
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND 
THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 13.03 (M. Bender, 1978) (citation omitted). 
29 Joshua M. Dalton & Sara Cable, The Copyright Defendant’s Guide to 
Disproving Substantial Similarity on Summary Judgment, LANDSLIDE, July/Aug. 
2011, at 29. 
9
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1. Circuit Tests for “Substantial Similarity” 
 
Circuit courts in copyright infringement cases use different 
tests to determine whether substantial similarity exists and 
infringement occurred. Typically, most “courts use one of two 
tests: the more discerning ordinary observer test associated with 
the Second Circuit or the extrinsic/intrinsic test associated with the 
Ninth Circuit.”30 The Tenth Circuit’s abstraction-filtration-
comparison test is also popularly used. While these tests are 
similar and will not drastically change the analysis an attorney 
must do for the client, an attorney must be aware that different 
courts choose to use slightly different tests that bring the jury into 
the analysis at different points. Because a jury may view a work 
through a different lens, an attorney should keep in mind when the 
court will rely on a jury and which test will be used. 
 
a. The Second Circuit’s “More Discerning Ordinary Observer 
Test” 
 
The Second Circuit typically uses the “ordinary observer test” 
to decide whether substantial similarity exists. “The ordinary 
observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be 
disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the 
same.”31 However, in copyrightable photographs, both protectable 
and unprotectable elements exist.32 Because not all of the elements 
in a photograph can be copyrighted, the Second Circuit abides by a 
slightly different rule that takes into account unprotectable 
elements. For these works of art, the Second Circuit uses the “more 
discerning ordinary observer test”: “where we compare products 
that contain both protectible [sic] and unprotectible [sic] elements, 
our inspection must be ‘more discerning’; we must attempt to 
extract the unprotectible [sic] elements from our consideration and 
ask whether the protectible [sic] elements, standing alone, are 
                                                                                                             
30 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 26, at 3.  
31 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d 
Cir. 1960). 
32 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 
(1991). 
10
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substantially similar.”33 Thus the Second Circuit, and any court 
that follow its test, first separates the unprotectable from the 
protectable, and only then does the court apply its “more 
discerning ordinary observer test” to find substantial similarity. 
The First Circuit, Third Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Seventh Circuit 
frequently apply the “ordinary observer test.” 
 
b. The Ninth Circuit’s “Intrinsic/Extrinsic Test” 
 
The Ninth Circuit departed from the Second Circuit and its 
followers to determine substantial similarity in Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.34 Initially, the Ninth 
Circuit created a two-part test: the “extrinsic test,” to be 
determined by the judge, and the “intrinsic test,” to be determined 
by the jury.35 The court went on to refine the difference between 
the extrinsic and intrinsic test. The extrinsic test “depends not on 
the responses of the trier of fact, but on specific criteria which can 
be listed and analyzed.”36 The criteria can “include the type of 
artwork involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the 
setting for the subject. Analytic dissection and expert testimony are 
appropriate. Moreover, this question may often be decided as a 
matter of law.”37 If the court finds similarity exists under the 
“extrinsic test,” it moves on to the second part of the test.  
In the “intrinsic test,” the fact finder decides whether the works 
are substantially similar “by the observations and impressions of 
the average reasonable reader and spectator.”38 Recognizing that 
district courts were analyzing intrinsic items under the extrinsic 
test, the Ninth Circuit later clarified that the extrinsic test is an 
objective analysis of expression, while the intrinsic test could be 
described as a subjective analysis of expression.39 As part of the 
                                                                                                             
33 Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 
1995). 
34 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
35 Id. at 1164. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (quoting Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 
579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944)). 
39 Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990). 
11
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extrinsic test, a court is to identify protected and unprotected 
elements.40 The Fourth Circuit and the Eight Circuit also follow 
the “intrinsic/extrinsic” test. 
 
c. The Tenth Circuit’s “Abstraction-Filtration-Comparison Test” 
 
The Tenth Circuit uses the “abstraction-filtration-comparison 
test,” which initially was used solely for computer copyright 
infringements.41 The abstraction level dissects the work into 
varying levels of generality, typically filtering “ideas” from 
“expressions.”42 The court then “examine[s] each level of 
abstraction in order to filter out those elements of the program 
which are unprotectable.”43 Finally, the court compares the 
“remaining protectable elements with the allegedly infringing 
program to determine whether the defendants have 
misappropriated substantial elements of the plaintiff's program.”44 
The Tenth Circuit’s test is chiefly derived from the Second 
Circuit’s “more discerning ordinary observer test.”45 
 
2. Filtering Unprotected Elements 
 
As a general matter, most courts first decide which elements of 
the original photograph are not copyrightable and then move 
through the remaining elements and compare those with the work 
of art in question.46 This process can severely burden or lighten the 
workload of the defense attorney. The attorney can mitigate 
damage by showing the court that additional elements are 
unprotected in the plaintiff’s work. A failure to address which 
                                                                                                             
40 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 913 (9th Cir. 2010). 
41 Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
42 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 1930). 
43 Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 834. 
44 Id. 
45 See Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997); 
Country Kids ’N City Slicks Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1996). 
46 See Gates Rubber Co., 9 F.3d at 833; Sid & Marty Krofft Television 
Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1977); Peter Pan 
Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960). 
12
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elements are unprotected may cause traditionally unprotected 
elements to evade filtration, thereby subjecting the client to further 
liability if substantial similarity is found in the remaining protected 
elements. 
Courts have consistently held that copyright protection does 
not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form 
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.”47 Additionally, “[t]wo photographs are not substantially 
similar . . . merely because they capture the same object or subject, 
or even because they capture a similar subject in a similar pose, if 
that pose is part of the subject’s natural movement or is otherwise 
common or predictable.”48 A mere copying of a subject is also 
unprotectable because it is an uncopyrightable idea.49  
For example, in Kaplan v. Stock Mkt. Photo Agency, the 
Southern District of New York described unprotectable elements 
of a photograph.50 In that case, two photographs depicted a scene 
in which a businessperson contemplated leaping from a tall 
building onto the bustling city street below. The court held that 
“nearly all the similarities between the works arise from 
noncopyrightable elements, thus rendering the works not 
substantially similar. . . . As the photograph’s central idea, rather 
than Kaplan’s expression of the idea, this subject matter is 
unprotectable in and of itself.”51 The pose of the subject, the 
clothes, and the viewpoint were also found to be unprotectable, as 
none of these elements were unusual to the subject matter of the 
photo.52  
 
                                                                                                             
47 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2014). 
48 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 26, at 10-3. 
49 Id. 
50 Kaplan v. Stock Mkt. Photo Agency, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 317, 323 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
13
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Figure 4: Top, defendant’s image. Bottom, plaintiff’s image. 
 
Additionally, filtering can put a client in the same positions as 
those defendants in Harney. An attorney may try to show the court 
that every similar element is actually unprotectable, leaving the 
peculiar situation where the works look exceptionally similar but 
the court decides no infringement has occured. The bulk of an 
attorney’s work should go toward proving that the similar elements 
in the two works are unprotected elements, and thus subject to 
copying without infringement. Indeed, Sony’s attorneys took this 
course in Harney, urging the court to recognize that all of the 
copied elements were unprotectable.53 
Some circuits have held that when enough unprotectable 
elements are used in the same manner as in the original work, 
                                                                                                             
53 Brief for Appellees at 14, Harney v. Sony Pictures Television, Inc., 704 
F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 2013) (No. 11-1760). 
14
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copyright infringement will be found. This caveat is likely to be 
unhelpful in the copyright of visual artists because it is typically 
applied to the copyright of information and computer programs.54  
When advocating for a client, an attorney should lump 
elements together in broad unprotectable categories. An attorney 
may do so by taking one of the unprotectable filters (“ideas” or 
“subject”) and show how the plaintiff attempts to copyright that 
unprotectable element:  
While the dividing line between an (unprotectable) 
idea and (protectable) expression is notoriously 
vague, a defendant should attempt to extrapolate the 
concepts within the plaintiff’s work as broadly as 
possible, and recast the similarities alleged as 
extending to those high level concepts only, and not 
to the plaintiff’s specific expression of those 
concepts.55  
By recasting an element as unprotectable, the attorney no longer 
needs to focus on that portion of the art. Additionally, the more 
elements declared unprotectable, the more difficult it becomes for 
a court to find copyright infringement on the remaining elements. 
A defense attorney’s best argument is to show that all the 
similarities in the photo are of unprotected elements. 
 
3. Distinguishing Protected Elements  
 
Once unprotectable elements have been sorted out of an 
infringement claim, the remaining elements are left open to a 
substantial similarity accusation. “The copyrightable elements of a 
photograph have been described as the photographer’s ‘original’ 
‘conception’ of his subject, not the subject itself.”56  
 
                                                                                                             
54 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
55 Dalton & Cable, supra note 29, at 26–29. 
56 Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
15
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Figure 5: Left, plaintiff’s photograph. Right, defendant’s photograph. 
 
Courts have agreed that “the copyrightable elements include 
such features as the photographer’s selection of lighting, shading, 
positioning and timing.”57 In Kisch v. Ammirati & Puris Inc., the 
court denied summary judgment to defendants and “conclude[d] 
that a rational trier of fact could find sufficient similarities to prove 
‘copying.’”58 
While the court recognized differences between the two 
photos, it identified “many similarities.” For example, the two 
photographs were taken from the same location, the “same small 
corner of the Village Vanguard nightclub” in New York City. The 
lighting and camera angle were similar. In both photographs the 
subjects are seated and holding a musical instrument, and “[t]he 
same striking mural appears as the background for each 
photograph.”59 But ultimately, though the subject matter 
(unprotectable) was dissimilar from the original photo, these 
protected elements showed substantial similarity.  
                                                                                                             
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 384. 
59 Id. 
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Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co.60 has provided attorneys and 
artists with some direction in defining “substantial similarity.” In 
Mannion, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York concluded “[a] photograph may be original in three 
respects:” rendition, timing, and creation of the subject.61 The court 
clarified: “First, ‘there may be originality which does not depend 
on creation of the scene or object to be photographed . . . and 
which resides [instead] in such specialties as angle of shot, light 
and shade, exposure, effects achieved by means of filters, 
developing techniques etc.’”62 The court referred to this type of 
originality as “originality in the rendition because, to the extent a 
photograph is original in this way, copyright protects not what is 
depicted, but rather how it is depicted.”63 A photograph may be 
original in a second respect. “[A] person may create a worthwhile 
photograph by being at the right place at the right time.” Mannion 
classifies these protected elements into clear categories, which can 
be helpful for an attorney trying to show the client did not infringe. 
In order to do so, an attorney will try to distinguish the protected 
elements in the client’s work from the protected elements in the 
plaintiff’s work.  
Copyright infringement, not surprisingly, cannot be avoided by 
changing the medium. “The governing principle is that despite 
differences in appearance that result from a change in the medium, 
if the ordinary observer familiar with the photograph would 
recognize the new work as having been taken from the expressive 
elements of the photograph, the works are substantially similar.”64 
Thus, while a change in medium can add ammunition to an 
argument that the protected elements are too dissimilar to show 
substantial similarity, an attorney must go beyond this argument 
and show why other protected elements in the plaintiff’s work are 
so different that substantial similarity cannot be shown.  
 
                                                                                                             
60 377 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
61 Id. at 452. 
62 Id.  
63 Id. 
64 OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 26, at 10-3. 
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4. Raising Affirmative Defenses 
 
If an attorney is unable to persuade the court that unprotected 
elements of the disputed piece are dissimilar, the attorney can raise 
a number of affirmative defenses. The most common defense is 
one of fair use, though many defenses are available under 
copyright law. Two doctrines are particularly relevant to 
infringement of photos: merger and scenes a faire. 
 
a. Merger 
 
Ideas are not copyrightable. In some cases, the expression of a 
certain idea is so close to the idea itself, the expression “merges” 
with the idea, and is not copyrightable.65 Merger is a judicially 
created rule and recognizes that some ideas can only be expressed 
in a limited number of ways. Thus, if an idea can only be 
expressed in a few different ways, a court will likely rule that 
expression is unprotected. To rule otherwise may prohibit 
expression of the idea. An attorney using “filtering” may apply the 
doctrine of merger to elements where the expression is limited by 
the idea itself.  
 
b. Scenes a Faire 
 
Under the doctrine of scenes a faire, “courts will not protect a 
copyrighted work from infringement if the expression embodied in 
the work necessarily flows from a commonplace idea.”66 Scenes a 
faire differs from merger in that scenes a faire refers to the most 
common way to express an idea, while merger may refer to the 
only way to express an idea. 
In Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., a photographer 
sued an art gallery for copyright infringement, alleging that the art 
gallery was displaying an unauthorized stained-glass reproduction 
of a photograph of a hula dancer.67 
                                                                                                             
65 See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 
61, 64 (2d Cir. 1994). 
66 Ets–Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000). 
67 Reece v. Island Treasures Art Gallery, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1199 
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Figure 6: Left, plaintiff’s photograph. Right, defendant’s stained glass 
artwork. 
 
After the court “separate[d] the protectable from the 
unprotectable elements,” it found “[e]lements particular to the hula 
kahiko tradition are scenes a faire.”68 Specifically, the court held 
that the positions and features were “indispensable, naturally 
associated with the motion,” and the “dancer’s hula kahiko dress” 
was “required.”69 Because these elements were scenes a faire, they 
were not protected by copyright.70 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the different tests that circuit courts use when 
determining copyright infringement, most courts follow the same 
general path. An attorney advocating for a client charged with 
copyright infringement should try to prove (1) the similar elements 
are unprotectable; (2) the protected elements that remain are 
                                                                                                             
(D. Haw. 2006). 
68 Id. at 1207. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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dissimilar and therefore the works cannot have “substantial 
similarity;” and (3) the defendant had the right to use the material 
under affirmative defenses. In dissecting the original copyrighted 
image into protectable and unprotectable elements, defending 
attorneys should attempt to recast those elements of the original 
image that are seemingly protected into elements that are 
unprotectable as a matter of law. Attorneys can do so by 
broadening the scope of the protected element. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Apply filtration extensively to eliminate as many elements 
as possible from the protected category. 
 Analogize protected elements broadly to unprotected 
elements. 
 After all unprotected elements have been filtered and 
defenses have been raised, argue that any similarity in the 
remaining elements is minimal and does not constitute 
substantial similarity. 
 Dissect each element into the smallest parts possible. 
 After filtering unprotected from protected elements, apply 
defenses and use merger and scenes a faire to move more 
elements out of the protected category. 
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